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Abstract
This study considers an oligopoly model with simultaneous price and quality choice. Ex-
ante homogeneous sellers compete by o¤ering products at one of two quality levels. The
consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality: for some consumers it is e¢ cient to buy
a high quality product, while for others it is e¢ cient to buy a low quality product. In the
symmetric equilibrium rms use mixed strategies that randomize both price and quality,
and obtain strictly positive prots. This framework highlights trade-o¤s which determine
the impact of consumer protection policy in the form of quality standards.
Keywords: Oligopoly; Price and quality competition; Quality standards
JEL classication: L13; L15; L50
1 Introduction
Di¤erences in the quality of groceries or household supplies sometimes stem from packaging or
labelling, availability of information, or expert/celebrity endorsements. Some products indicate
an improved recipe, added vitamin C, are labelled as healthy living options, or are endorsed by
celebrities/experts. Such quality improvements most often do not call for a long term decision.
Firms can relatively frequently change the packaging, slightly improve a recipe or arrange for
an endorsement, and rivals are unlikely to observe the internal price-quality decision before
making their own choices. Furthermore, in these markets consumers are likely to di¤er in their
willingness to pay for quality. Building on these observations, this study proposes an oligopoly
model where sellers simultaneously compete in quality and price.
More specically, this analysis shows that in the symmetric equilibrium of the price-quality
competition model, the rms randomize on both prices and qualities. In this setting, price and
quality dispersion emerges from competition of ex-ante identical sellers in the provision of a
homogeneous product. Some important features of this model are the following. Sellers can
choose between two levels of quality. All consumers value both qualities, but it is e¢ cient for
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some consumers to buy a high-quality, and for others to buy a low-quality.1 The sellers know the
valuations for either quality and their distribution in the population, but they cannot distinguish
among buyers and, therefore, cannot price discriminate. The sellers o¤er their products at only
one of two quality levels.2
In some professional service markets, the providers (e.g., lawyers, consultants, architects) also
compete for consumers not only by quoting a price for the service, but also by simultaneously
setting a quality level. The rms are able to provide the same service at di¤erent levels of
quality, but often a rms o¤er is not preceded by a negotiation process, so that there is little
transparency regarding the alternative qualities that could have been provided (and could have
been closer to consumers actual needs.) For instance, when economic consulting rms make
a pitch to a customer, they simply submit a price-quality bid without knowing with certainty
the exact level of complexity preferred for the project. A rm seeking professional advice might
have a higher or a smaller stake in an ongoing antitrust investigation, and a person seeking
legal advice might have a higher or a lower income. Another example of markets where the
rms compete simultaneously over price and quality is the business software one. In this case,
a quality level might stem, for instance, from the maintenance service terms. In these markets,
corporate customers are likely to value the speed of response more than home users.
In the price-quality competition model, low-quality is always associated with lower prices,
and high-quality with higher prices. At equilibrium, there is a positive probability that any one
rm is the sole provider of a given quality and, even though it faces some competition from the
other quality, it can charge a price in excess of marginal cost. The di¤erence between the highest
(lowest) price for a high-quality product and lowest (highest) price for a low-quality product is
equal to the di¤erence in high-end (low-end) consumersvaluation for the high and low-quality
products. Moreover, the symmetric equilibrium leads to positive expected prots for the rms.
Due to the fact that high-end (low-end) consumers can eventually shift to a di¤erent quality,
the highest price at which a high-quality (low-quality) is o¤ered is strictly lower than high-end
(low-end) consumersvaluation of the high-quality (low-quality). Low-end consumers obtain a
positive net surplus if they purchase a low-quality and, for a nontrivial range of parameters,
this is also the case when they buy a high-quality. High-end consumers are left with a positive
net surplus regardless of the quality they consume. This contrasts with most price dispersion
models where prices equal to consumerswillingness to pay for the good are charged with pos-
itive probability.3 This is the case in Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980), for instance, where
homogeneous sellers compete for consumers with identical preferences who di¤er in their search
costs. Some buyers have innite search costs and shop at random, while the others purchase
from the lowest price seller. The expected prot of a rm equals the monopoly prot on its
locked-in group (i.e., the corresponding share of random shoppers.)
1That is, high-end consumersmarginal valuation of the high quality exceeds its cost, while the remaining
(low-end) consumersmarginal valuation of the high quality does not exceed its cost.
2However, the equilibrium characterized in this research is consistent with a market in which the sellers rst
decide whether to o¤er only one or both qualities, but to put up a menu of qualities they incur a positive cost.
3For a review of the price dispersion literature see Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006).
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Armstrong and Chen (2009) analyze price and quality competition in oligopoly. In their
model, like in the current one, a high-quality is associated with high prices and a low-quality
with lower prices. However, they consider consumers with homogeneous tastes for quality who
di¤er in their attentiveness to quality (a low-quality is worthless and would not be produced if
there were no inattentiveness).4
Other models of price and quality competition consider consumer heterogeneity, but focus
on perfectly competitive markets. Wolinsky (1983) analyses a market where the consumers may
di¤er in their taste for quality and receive noisy signals of a sellers quality. He shows that a
separating equilibrium where prices fully reveal quality exists under certain conditions. Buyers
with homogenous tastes for quality might still di¤er in their knowledge of product quality: while
some are fully aware of quality, others are not.5 Along this line, Cooper and Ross (1984) allow
quality-uninformed consumers to have rational expectations about the price-quality relationship.
They show that, with U-shaped average cost functions, there exists a rational expectations
equilibrium with dispersion in qualities but not in prices.
Most oligopoly models of price and quality competition focus on cases where quality is a
long-run variable, while prices can be adjusted in the short-run (see Shaked and Sutton, 1982
for a seminal contribution). They reect the fact that a quality improvement might involve
observable changes in the production facility or long-run investments (e.g., R&D). While this is
often the case, there are also many markets where a quality update does not call for signicant
investments or is unlikely to be observed by the rivals prior to price competition. In the latter
cases, strategic interaction is better captured by simultaneous price-quality competition.
The price-quality competition model o¤ers a framework for the analysis of quality standards
(QS) in oligopoly. Such intervention has been employed in professional service provision either by
governmental entities or professional associations to improve market performance.6 However,
QS in oligopoly markets received little attention in the economic literature, and the extant
analyses focus on instances in which quality choices precede pricing decisions. The impact of
QS in this framework is driven by the trade-o¤ between increasing competition and o¤ering
consumers the quality they desire, and it pins down the potentially perverse e¤ects of quality
regulation. The impact of a relevant QS which would lead to Bertrand competition depends
on the underlying market conditions. This study shows that the a QS might reduce both total
welfare and consumer surplus. However, depending on the parameter values, a QS might also
boost both total welfare and consumer surplus, or harm welfare while beneting the consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium when the market is fully covered. Section 3 discusses quality standards and
section 4 concludes. The proofs missing from the text and the characterization of the symmetric
equilibrium when the market is not covered are relegated to the Appendix.
4An alternative "rational" interpretation of their model is that some consumers do not mind consuming the
low-quality product.
5Yet another type of consumer heterogeneity is present in Besancenot and Vranceanu (2004), where high-end
consumers are loyal to the high-quality product (they only care for the extra features provided by a high-quality).
6See, for instance, OFT (2001) and EC (2004, 2005) reports on competition in professions.
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2 A Model of Price and Quality Competition
 The Framework
Consider a market where N  2 identical suppliers can o¤er an otherwise homogeneous
product at two quality levels, a high one (qH) and a low one (qL). The constant marginal cost of
producing the high-quality is c > 0; while the one of producing the low-quality is normalized to
zero. Sellers simultaneously choose prices and qualities. Each rm o¤ers only one quality level.
There is a unit mass of consumers, each demanding one unit of the product. A fraction 1   
of the consumers are willing to pay 1 for the low-quality and 3 for the high-quality, while a
fraction  of the consumers has willingness to pay for the low and high-quality equal to 2 and
4; respectively. I assume that 1 > 0; 3 > c and i > j for i > j, and refer to the consumers
with a lower (higher) valuation for either quality as "low-end" ("high-end").7 Assume that it
is e¢ cient for low-end consumers to buy a low-quality and for the high-end consumers to buy
a high-quality product, that is 3   1 < c < 4   2: However, at equilibrium consumers will
purchase the quality which provides the best deal.
In this model, consumers are able to compare all available products both in terms of price
and quality before they purchase. Firms know consumersvaluations for either quality and the
market composition, but cannot price discriminate. When  = 0 (or  = 1), rms supply the
e¢ cient quality qL (or qH), compete a la Bertrand, and make zero prots. The remainder of
this paper focuses on  2 (0; 1):
Lemma 1 For  2 (0; 1); a) there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium; and b) for N  4;
there is a family of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, where at least two rms choose each
quality, low-quality is o¤ered at p = 0 and high-quality at p = c; and all rms make zero prots.
Total welfare and consumer surplus are given by
(4   c)+ 1(1  ): (1)
Armstrong and Chen (2009) present similar results in a model of bounded rationality (inat-
tentiveness) with price-quality competition. In their setting, consumers have homogeneous tastes
for quality, but a fraction of them do not observe (or assess) quality and (wrongly) believe that
all products are of the same (high) quality.8 In the symmetric equilibrium of their model rms
mix on both qualities and prices. To exploit consumersinattentiveness, rms provide a useless
low-quality product with a positive probability. In contrast, in the current model rms face fully
rational consumers and the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium discussed below is related to
heterogeneity in consumerstastes.
 The Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
For any N  2, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which rms choose both prices and
qualities stochastically and make positive prots. The convex hull of the range of prices which
7Note that consumersvaluations can be derived from Mussa-Rosen preferences.
8Consumersvaluations in their model are not consistent with Mussa-Rosen preferences.
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are assigned positive probability is [p0; p4] ; with 0 < p0 < p4 < 4: There are two threshold
prices p1 2 [p0; 1] and p2 2 [c; p4] such that a low-quality product is chosen if p  p1 and a
high one if p  p2 > p1: The probability of o¤ering a low-quality product is F (p1) = F (p2) = P .
The discussion in this section focuses on a situation in which the market is fully covered in
equilibrium. Appendix A presents a necessary condition for the market to be fully covered for
an arbitrary number of rms. However, for expositional simplicity, this section assumes that the
following su¢ cient condition holds:
  2 + 3   4
3   c : (2)
This condition guarantees that p4  3 so that regardless of the price draw all consumers buy the
product. A necessary condition for (2) to hold is 3 > 4  2: Finally, note that if 3  4  2;
then p4 > 3 and with a positive probability low-end consumers are excluded from the market.
The analysis of this case is presented in Appendix B.
When (2) holds, the support of the equilibrium price distributions is S = [p0; p1] [ [p2; p4].9
The boundary prices p2 and p4 satisfy:
p2 = p1 + 3   1 and p4 = p0 + 4   2: (3)
The di¤erence between the lowest price at which a high-quality is o¤ered (p2) and the highest
price at which the low-quality is o¤ered (p1) is exactly equal to low-end consumersmarginal
valuation for quality (that is, the di¤erence between low-end consumersvaluation for the high-
quality and their valuation for the low-quality, 3 1). At the same time, the di¤erence between
the highest price at which a high-quality is o¤ered (p4) and the lowest price at which the low-
quality product is o¤ered (p0) is determined by high-end consumersmarginal valuation for
quality (that is, the di¤erence between high-end consumersvaluation for the high-quality and
their valuation for the low-quality product, 4   2).
Then, notice that the expected prots of a rm at price p0 are
(p0) = p0[1  + (P + 1  F (p0 + 4   2))N 1] = p0[1  + PN 1]: (4)
At this price only a low-quality is o¤ered. Low-end consumers buy for sure at price p0: a low-
quality is never sold at a lower price, and a high-quality (for which they are willing to pay at
most 3) provides them with a lower surplus even when it is sold at its lowest possible price
(p2). High-end consumers buy at p0 only if all rms supply a low-quality. Notice that even if
the high-quality is provided at its maximal price (p4) still high-end consumers are indi¤erent
between purchasing the high-quality and buying a low-quality at p0; its lowest possible price
(this happens because 2   p0 = 4   p4). The last equality in expression (4) follows from the
fact that F (p0 + 4   2) = F (p4) = 1: This must be the case because if all rms had an atom
at p4; then an individual rm would be strictly better o¤ moving mass to p4    for some small
9When the market is covered in the symmetric equilibrium, the only relevant boundary prices are p0; p1; p2
and p4: In the uncovered market analysis, boundary price p3 comes into play (see Appendix B).
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 > 0:10 The expected prots at price p4 are given by
(p4) = p4P
N 1 = (p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1: (5)
At price p4 only a high-quality is o¤ered. When p4  3; low-end consumers would buy at p4
with probability (1  F (p4))N 1: This is the probability that all suppliers price above p4 and is
equal to zero.
In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, a rm is indi¤erent between any two prices
which are assigned positive density. Then, from the equilibrium requirement that (p0) = (p4),
it follows that
p0 = (4   2   c) 
1  P
N 1: (6)
Note that low-end consumers are indi¤erent between buying a low-quality at price p1 and a
high-quality at price p2 (see (3)). In e¤ect, they weakly prefer a low-quality at price p  p1
to a high-quality. High-end consumers buy a low-quality at price p1 only if no rm supplies
a high-quality and all low-quality suppliers price above p1: But, this happens with probability
zero. Formally, the expected prot of a rm charging price p1 is:
(p1) = p1[(1  )(1  F (p1))N 1 + (P   F (p1))N 1] = p1(1  )(1  P )N 1:
By the previous argument low-end consumers buy at p2 only if no rm supplies a low-quality.
High-end consumers buy for sure at price p2: this is the best high-quality deal they can get and it
provides a higher net surplus than the best possible low-quality deal (2 p0 < 4 (p1+3 1),
p2 < p4). Then, the expected prot of a rm at price p2 is:
(p2) = (p2 c)

+ (1  )(1  F (p2))N 1

= (p1+3 1 c)

+ (1  )(1  P )N 1 : (7)
The constant prot condition (p1) = (p2) denes
p1 = (1   3 + c)[1 + 1  

(1  P )N 1]: (8)
Using (6), (8), and the equilibrium requirement that (p0) = (p2); I obtain
1  

2 1   3 + c
4   2   c [
+ (1  )(1  P )N 1
(1  ) + PN 1 ] =

P
1  P
N 1
: (9)
Expression (9) implicitly denes the probability of choosing a low-quality (P ) which is well
dened.11 If (2) holds, these expressions are su¢ cient to characterize the equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 1 If (2) holds and N  2; there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
where rms randomize on prices and qualities. Firms choose prices with support S = [p0; p1] [
[p2; p4]: The boundary prices p0; p1; p2 and p4 are dened by (3), (6) and (8). The atomless
price cdf F (p) is dened implicitly by
p[(1  )(1  F (p))N 1 + (P   F (p))N 1] = p1(1  )(1  P )N 1 for p0  p  p1 and (10)
(p  c)[(P + 1  F (p))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p))N 1] = (p4   c)PN 1 for p2  p  p4; (11)
10This would result in a jump up in demand and only a negligible loss due to the lower price.
11The RHS of (9) is increasing in P and ranges from 0 to 1, while the LHS is positive and decreasing in P;
such that there is unique solution in [0; 1].
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where P = F (p1) = F (p2) is the probability of choosing a low-quality and is dened by (9). A
low-quality product is associated with prices in [p0; p1] and a high-quality product with prices in
[p2; p4]:
In this symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, rms o¤er both a low-quality (at a relatively
low price) and a high-quality (at a higher price) with positive probability. As a result of this
randomization, with a positive probability, each rm is the sole provider of a given quality and
the sellers are able to sustain positive prots. The mixed strategy equilibrium crucially depends
on demand heterogeneity: for some consumers it is e¢ cient to buy a low-quality, while for others
it is e¢ cient to buy a high-quality.12
Recall that each rm chooses only one quality level in this model. Even if rms could o¤er a
menu of (both) qualities at a cost, the equilibrium presented in Proposition 1 would still apply
to a game in which rms rst decide if to provide just one quality level or both. If rms o¤ered
both qualities at di¤erent prices, they would end up competing a la Bertrand in two separate
markets. Then, they would obtain zero prots and be unable to cover the cost of providing both
qualities. Similarly, if rms face some xed costs of entry, only the mixed strategy equilibrium
could support entry.
In the covered market equilibrium presented in Proposition 1, high-end consumers buy a
high-quality product if at least one rm supplies it (which happens with probability 1   PN )
and buy a low-quality product only if all rms o¤er a low-quality. Low-end consumers buy a
low-quality product if at least one rm supplies it (which happens with probability 1 (1 P )N )
and buy a high-quality product only if all rms o¤er high-quality products. Then, welfare is
given by
(4   c)(1  PN ) + 2PN + 1(1  )[1  (1  P )N ] + (3   c)(1  )(1  P )N :
Aggregate prots follow from (5) and (6). Consumer surplus equals total welfare minus aggregate
prots. Algebraic manipulations lead to the following result.
Corollary 1 If (2) holds, at equilibrium, the expected prot of a rm is
E = (4   2   c)(1 + 
1  P
N 1)PN 1;
total welfare is
(4   c)+ 1(1  )  (4   2   c)PN   (c  3 + 1)(1  )(1  P )N ; (12)
and consumer surplus is given by
(4 c)+1(1 ) (4 2 c)PN 1[P+N(1+ 
1  P
N 1)] (c 3+1)(1 )(1 P )N ; (13)
where P is implicitly dened by (9).
12As expected in a model where consumers can correctly assess product quality, at equilibrium there is a
monotonic relationship between price and quality.
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The source of welfare and consumer surplus loss in the covered market symmetric equilibrium
in Proposition 1 comes from the fact that with a positive probability consumers buy an ine¢ cient
quality. With probability one, all consumers buy and obtain a positive net surplus. But, when
all rms o¤er a low-quality (i.e., with probability PN ) high-end consumers obtain a surplus of
2; lower than the net surplus of (4 c) which is their rst best. Likewise, when all rms o¤er a
high-quality (i.e., with probability (1 P )N ) low-end consumers buy an ine¢ ciently low-quality.
Notice that the rst two terms in expressions (12) and (13) give the rst best outcome and the
last two terms are negative. The term in square brackets in (13) captures the consumer surplus
loss due to pricing above marginal cost.
When the market is not covered (that is, for p4 > 3)13, the symmetric equilibrium introduces
a second source of ine¢ ciency. In that case, low-end consumers are excluded from the market
with a positive probability (i.e., (1   F (3))N > 0) and obtain zero surplus. Proposition 3 in
Appendix B presents the symmetric equilibrium when the market is not covered.14
The following example illustrates the type of mixed strategy equilibrium presented in Propo-
sition 1.15
Example 1 Let N = 2;  = :5; 1 = 6; 2 = 8; c = 10; 3 = 14 and 4 = 20: Using the results
in Proposition 1, at equilibrium, p0 = 1; p1 = 3; p2 = 11; p4 = 13 and P = :5: The price cdf is
F (p) =
(
:75  :75p for p 2 [1; 3]
1:25  :75p 10 for p 2 [11; 13]
:
Firms o¤er a low-quality at price p 2 [1; 3] and o¤er a high-quality at p 2 [11; 13]. The equilib-
rium prot is :75: Consumer surplus is 6 and total welfare is 7:5. Figure 1 illustrates the mixed
strategy equilibrium in this case.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
F(p)
Figure 1: The price cdf in Example 1
13Recall that a su¢ cient condition to be in this region is 3 < 4   2:
14Notice that the type of equilibrium which applies depends both on the degree of consumer heterogeneity and
on the number of rms. When N ! 1; p0 ! 0 ; and it is possible to have p4 = 4   2 + p0 > 3 for N < N0
and 4   2 < 3 for N  N0 for some N0  3: For this reason, the necessary condition for an uncovered market
symmetric equilibrium to exist depends on N: (Appendix A presents a necessary condition for a covered market
symmetric equilibrium to exist for an arbitary number of rms.)
15Example 2 in Appendix B illustrates the symmetric equilibrium when the market is not fully covered.
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 Large Oligopolies
First notice that when N !1; the probability to choose a low-quality is dened by

1  


1   3 + c
4   2   c =

P
1  P
N 1
, P =
h 
1 


1 3+c
4 2 c
i1=N 1
1 +
h 
1 


1 3+c
4 2 c
i1=N 1 :
Then, limN!1 P = 1=2: From (3), (6) and (8), it follows that p0 ! 0 and p2 ! c as N ! 1;
such that the equilibrium cdf in Proposition 1 converges to a discrete distribution which assigns
probability 1/2 to p0 and probability 1/2 to p2: In addition, a rms prot and total industry
prots both converge to zero when the market is nearly competitive. The outcome of the
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium converges to the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium of
the game presented in Lemma 1: total welfare and consumer surplus in the limit are equal to
(4   c)+ 1(1  ) (see (12) and (13)).
3 Consumer Protection Policy: Quality Standards
The price-quality competition model can be employed to analyze consumer protection policy.
This section shows that the impact of a relevant quality standard (QS)16, which would lead to
Bertrand competition in the symmetric equilibrium, depends crucially on the underlying market
conditions. In a setting of imperfect competition and heterogeneity in consumerspreferences
for quality, a QS is benecial for some consumers at the expense of others. Then, the overall
e¤ect of such policy on welfare and consumer surplus depends on the composition of the market
and on the relative e¢ ciency gain of a quality match.
Studies of QSs in competitive markets with asymmetric information (see Leland, 1979;
Shapiro, 1983; and Armstrong, 2008 for a review) have already indicated that some consumer
groups might be harmed by the mandatory policy. However, these models do not account for
the e¤ects of QSs on prices. Studies of QSs under oligopoly price competition (Ronnen, 1991;
Crampes and Hollander, 1995) build on the decrease in prices brought about by the policy and
conclude that the intervention is always welfare increasing.17 In a duopoly model where rms
rst choose quality and then prices, and face quality-dependent xed costs, Ronnen (1991) shows
that a QS intensies price competition by limiting vertical di¤erentiation and is benecial to
consumers. Crampes and Hollander (1995) show, in a related duopoly model where the cost of
quality is variable, that a QS might decrease consumer surplus. This happens if the increase
in the low-quality brought about by the intervention triggers a signicant increase in the high-
quality.18 In this case, the increase in prices due to higher costs o¤sets the competitive e¤ect. In
16A relevant QS lies between the lowest and the highest available quality levels and has a short-run e¤ect on
equilibrium outcomes.
17 In the case of oligopoly quantity competition, Valletti (2000) shows that QS unambiguously decrease welfare.
18 In both Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1995), in the unregulated equilibrium, the duopolists
choose deterministic asymmetric quality levels. Notice also, that unlike the current model where a QS decreases
prots, in these studies the intervention benets the low-quality supplier and harms the high-quality one.
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contrast, in my oligopoly model with exogenous quality levels, the impact of a QS depends on
the trade-o¤ between the (positive) competitive e¤ect and the (negative) e¤ect of less product
diversity, and overall the intervention might reduce welfare.
Notice that, under a relevant QS, welfare and consumer surplus in the price-quality compe-
tition model are both given by
WMQS = CSMQS = (4   c) + (1  )(3   c): (14)
A straightforward comparison of the welfare levels in the symmetric free-market equilibrium
(12) and under a QS (14) leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 If (2) holds and N  2; a quality standard is welfare decreasing i¤
(4   2   c)PN < (c  3 + 1) (1  )[1  (1  P )N ];
and it decreases consumer surplus i¤
(4   2   c)PN 1[P +N(1 + 
1  P
N 1)] < (c  3 + 1) (1  )[1  (1  P )N ]:
Notice that, as N goes to innity, the LHS of both inequalities in Proposition 2 converges
to zero while the RHS converges to (c  3 + 1) (1   ) > 0: In nearly competitive markets,
a QS harms both consumer surplus and total welfare. The reason is that, in these markets,
competition eliminates the price distortion (recall that p0 ! 0 and p2 ! c as N !1) and the
intervention only restricts consumerschoice.
Unlike the limit case, in smaller oligopolies the impact of a QS is not clear-cut. For an
arbitrary number of rms, there is no closed-form solution for P; the probability to choose a
low-quality in the symmetric equilibrium (see (9)). But, for N = 2; it is possible to calculate P
and write the conditions in Proposition 2 in terms of the parameters. This allows to discuss the
implication of QSs for di¤erent parameter regions.
Corollary 2 Let N = 2 and b = (1  3+ c)=(4  2  c): When (2) holds, a) if  = 1=2; then
a quality standard is always welfare decreasing, and it decreases (increases) consumer surplus
i¤ b > 3:2 (b < 3:2); b) if b = 1; then a quality standard is always welfare decreasing, and it
decreases (increases) consumer surplus i¤  / 0:27 ( ' 0:27); c) if b =


1  
2
then for
 / 0:215 a quality standard raises both welfare and consumer surplus.
The previous result shows that, depending on the parameter values, a QS might decrease both
welfare and consumer surplus, increase them both, or harm welfare while increasing consumer
surplus. In contrast to previous studies of QSs in imperfectly competitive markets (Ronnen,
1991; Crampes and Hollander, 1995), Corollary 2 shows that even though the intervention
intensies price competition in oligopoly, it might harm consumers and total welfare. The
undesired e¤ects of intervention in this study stem from the existence of a critical mass of
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consumers whose valuation of the incremental quality imposed by the QS does not cover its
cost.19
Figure 2 presents expected welfare and consumer surplus in the symmetric unregulated
equilibrium and under a QS: for xed  and i; c ranges from 8 to 9:7 such that b (= (1  3+
c)=(4   2   c)) ranges from 0 to 0:75:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6.0
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
7.0
7.2
b
Figure 2: Expected welfare (thick line) and consumer surplus (dashed line) in the symmetric
equilibrium. Welfare and consumer surplus (thin line) under a MQS. (N = 2;  = :2; 1 = 6;
2 = 8; 3 = 14; 4 = 20)
Corollary 2 part c) shows that a QS is benecial for the consumers and the society when
there are few high-end consumers ( small) and the relative e¢ ciency gain of quality match to
the low-end consumers (captured by b = (1   3 + c)=(4   2   c)) is low. When  is small,
the probability that all rms choose a low-quality is higher, and the intervention is more likely
to make a di¤erence to the high-end consumers. But, if b is also low, a QS raises both consumer
surplus and welfare. This is the case in Figure 2 where  = 0:2 for low enough bs. In this region,
the positive e¤ect of a QS on price competition o¤sets its negative e¤ect on product diversity.
In contrast, when there are many high-end consumers ( large), p2 (the best high-quality deal)
is close to c and P (the probability of choosing a low-quality) is close to 0; so that there is less
scope for intervention.
For intermediate values of b the intervention benets consumers, but harms total welfare:
in this region, the price e¤ect is strong enough to o¤set the lack of product diversity, but the
society is harmed by the quality mismatches. Finally for higher values of b; a QS harms both
consumers and welfare: the relative net value of quality to the low-end consumers is high, and
the negative impact of reduced variety dominates.
The analysis in this section shows that the impact of consumer protection in the form of QS
stems from a trade-o¤ between increasing competition and catering to consumers with di¤erent
tastes for quality. Although the intervention increases competition, it also harms consumers
19Appendix B focuses on the uncovered market equilibrium and shows that a QS might still decrease welfare
and consumer surplus, even when it improves consumersparticipation in the market. (See Example 3.)
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when they place low value on quality.20 Understanding the undesired e¤ects of QS is particularly
important as recent evidence on consumers inattention to ne print terms or shrouded price
attributes might make consumer protection policy more appealing. If randomization on quality
and prices is driven only by inattention (as in Armstrong and Chen, 2009), a QS is obviously
benecial. But, my analysis shows that similar market outcomes might stem from heterogeneity
in consumerstastes for quality. As the presence of few inattentive high-end consumers would
not alter qualitatively the equilibrium strategies, with heterogeneous preferences, the e¤ect of a
QS meant to protect the inattentives is no longer clear-cut. As a QS forces low-end consumers
to purchase an ine¢ ciently high-quality product, it might actually harm consumers and welfare
overall.21
4 Conclusions
In professional service markets and in some consumer good markets, packaging, labelling, en-
dorsements, or maintenance service terms can be used to o¤er better value to buyers. As quality
improvements can be made in the short-run and are unlikely to be observed by rivals prior to
product market interaction, these situations call for a model of simultaneous price and quality
competition. This paper proposed an oligopoly model where ex-ante identical sellers compete in
the provision of a product by simultaneously submitting price-quality bids. Each rm chooses
one of two quality levels. The consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality: it is e¢ cient for
some consumers to buy a high-quality, while for others is e¢ cient to buy a low-quality. In the
symmetric equilibrium rms use mixed strategies that randomize both price and quality, and
obtain strictly positive prots.
The analysis of consumer protection in the form of quality standards in this setting captures
(undesired) e¤ects neglected by previous models of imperfect competition. The intervention
increases price competition, but reduces product diversity.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. a) If all rms choose high (or, low) quality, they compete a la Bertrand
and make zero prots. Then, a unilateral deviation to a low (or, high) quality and price p
is protable as it generates strictly positive prots equal to (1   )" (or, ("   c)) whenever
0 < p < c (3 1) (or, c < p < 4 2). Hence, there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
20Under perfect competition and informational asymmetries, Leland (1979) derives conditions under which QS
increases welfare, but warns that "when entry is restricted in this manner detrimental side e¤ects may occur."
While the negative impact of intervention in his setting is the same as here, the positive e¤ect is di¤erent as it
stems from correcting the "lemons problem".
21Armstrong (2008, pp. 146-7) introduces inattention (some consumers prefer a high quality, but do not pay
attention to quality) in the perfectly competitive version of this model and shows that a QS meant to protect the
inattentive, might be benecial or not depending on the parameter values. (In his perfectly competitive model, a
QS is always harmful if there is no inattention. In contrast, under imperfect competition, QS do have a positive
price e¤ect.)
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b) If at least two rms o¤er a low-quality and at least two rms o¤er a high-quality, all rms
compete a la Bertrand, make zero prots and there is no protable unilateral deviation. In this
equilibrium, all low-end consumers buy a low-quality at p = 0 and all high-end consumers buy
a high-quality at p = c.
5.1 Appendix A: Covered Market Equilibrium
Conditions for the Existence of a Symmetric Covered Market Equilibrium
For expositional simplicity, the main text assumes that (2) holds. This is a su¢ cient condition
for the market to be covered in the symmetric equilibrium. Let us now derive (2) and present
a more complex necessary condition for an arbitrary number of rms.
First note that the market is covered in the symmetric equilibrium if p4  3; where p4 is
the upper bound of the support of the equilibrium pricing cdf. (Clearly, if p4 > 3 there is
a positive probability that low-end consumers are excluded from the market. This happens if
all rm o¤er high-quality products at prices higher than low-end consumersvaluation of the
high-quality product, 3:) By (3) and (6),
p4 = (4   2   c) 
1  P
N 1 + 4   2: (15)
Using the fact that P < 1 (see 9), the requirement that p4  3 leads to the su¢ cient condition
(2):
  2 + 3   4
3   c :
To obtain a necessary condition for the market to be covered in the symmetric equilibrium for
an arbitrary number of rms, note that P (N) is decreasing (see (9)), so that p4(N) is decreasing.
It follows that p4(N)  p4(2): Using (15), p4(2) = (4   2   c) 1 P (2) + 4   2; where P (2)
follows from (9):
P (2) =
b(1 )2(2 )+2(1 ) 
p
[b(1 )2(2 )+2(1 )]2 4b(1 )2[b(1 )3 3]
2[b(1 )3 3] ;
where b = (1   3 + c)=(4   2   c): Then, p4  3 for any N  2 i¤
b(1  )(2  )+ 3   p[b(1  )(2  ) + 2]2   4b[b(1  )3   3]
2[b(1  )3   3] 
3   4 + 2
4   2   c :
Proof of Proposition 1. For F (p) dened by (10) and (11) to be a well-dened cdf, it has to
be continuous and increasing on S: Let us rst consider prices in [p0; p1] : By (10), F is increasing
in p: I show in continuation that F (p0) = 0: Notice that (10) evaluated at p0 gives
p0[(1  )(1  F (p0))N 1 + (P   F (p0))N 1] = p1(1  )(1  P )N 1
and using (6) and (8) it becomes
1  

2 1   3 + c
4   2   c [
+ (1  )(1  P )N 1
(1  )(1  F (p0))N 1 + (P   F (p0))N 1 ] =

P
1  P
N 1
: (16)
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But from (9) and (16), it follows that F (p0) = 0:
Let us consider prices in [p2; 3] \ [p2; p4]: By (11), F is increasing in p: I show in continuation
that F (p2) = P: Notice that (11) evaluated at p2 gives
(p2   c)[(P + 1  F (p2))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p2))N 1] = (p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1 ,
(p1 + 3   1   c)[(P + 1  F (p2))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p2))N 1] = (p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1
and using (6) and (8) it becomes
1  

2 1   3 + c
4   2   c [
(P + 1  F (p2))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p2))N 1
1  + PN 1 ] =

P
1  P
N 1
: (17)
But from (9) and (17), it follows that F (p2) = P = F (p1): In addition, notice that if p4 =
p0 + 4   2 2 [p2; 3] then (11) evaluated at p4 gives
(p4   c)[(P + 1  F (p4))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p4))N 1] = (p4   c)PN 1
and it follows that F (p4) = 1:
The boundary price p1 should not exceed 1: If p4  3; from (5) and (7), it follows that
p1 = 1   3 + c+ (p0 + 4   2   c) P
N 1
+ (1  )(1  P )N 1  1   3 + p4  1:
For the strategies presented in Proposition 1 to be indeed an equilibrium, there should be no
protable unilateral deviation. The relevant deviations to be considered in this case are the
following: i. o¤er a low-quality at p 2 (p1; 1]; ii. o¤er a high-quality at p 2 [c; p2]; and iii. o¤er
a high-quality at p 2 (p4; 4]:
Notice that deviations with a high-quality on [p0; c] are not protable because the price is below
marginal cost and deviations with a low-quality in (2; 4] are not protable because the price
exceeds the willingness to pay for low-quality. Notice that deviations with a low-quality to some
price p 2 (1; 2)\ (p1; 2) are not protable: Low-end consumers cannot a¤ord the low-quality.
High-end consumers buy only if a high-quality is not o¤ered at this price (i.e., F (2)  F (p2)).
Then, they purchase at p with probability (P   F (p) + 1   F (p + 4   2))N 1 = 0. The last
equality follows from the fact that, in this range, p + 4   2 > p0 + 4   2 = p4 so that
F (p+ 4   2) = 1 and F (p) = P:
i. The deviator o¤ers a low-quality at p 2 (p1; 1]: low-end consumers buy at p only if all other
rms price above 3   1 + p. high-end consumers buy at p with probability (P   F (p) + 1  
F (p+ 4   2))N 1 = 0: Then, deviators prot is
D(p) = p(1  )(1  F (p+ 3   1))N 1:
As p 2 (p1; 1]; notice that p +    L 2 (p1 + 3   1; 3] = (p2; 3]: Then F (p + 3   1) is
dened by
(p+ 3   1   c)[(1  F (p+ 3   1) + P )N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p+ 3   1))N 1] = E : (18)
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Notice that, by continuity, D(p1) = p1(1   )(1   F (p2))N 1 = p1(1   )(1   P )N 1 = E :
Using (18), deviators price and prots are given respectively by
p = c+ 1   3 + E
[(1  F (p+ 3   1) + P )N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p+ 3   1))N 1] and
D(F ) = fc+ 1   3 + E
[(1  F + P )N 1 + (1  )(1  F )N 1]g(1  )(1  F )
N 1:
For 3   c < 1; @D(F )@F < 0 such that D(p)  D(p1) = E : Consequently, this is not a
protable deviation.
ii. The deviator o¤ers a high-quality at p 2 [c; p2). Then, his expected prot is
D(p) = (p  c)[+ (1  )(1  F (p+ 1   3))N 1]:
Clearly, all high-end consumers buy at p. low-end consumers buy only if all other rms price
above p+ 1   3. As p 2 [c; p2); (p+ 1   3) 2 [c+ 1   3; p1):
First let us consider deviations to p such that p + 1   3 2 [p0; p1): Then, F (p + 1   3) is
dened by
(p+1 3)[(1 )(1 F (p+1 3))N 1+(P F (p+1 3))N 1] = p1(1 )(1 P )N 1: (19)
By (19), deviators price and its prot are respectively:
p = 3   1 + p1(1  )(1  P )
N 1
(1  )(1  F )N 1 + (P   F )N 1 > c and
D(F ) = f3   1   c+ p1(1  )(1  P )
N 1
(1  )(1  F )N 1 + (P   F )N 1 g[+ (1  )(1  F )
N 1]:
It can be shown that @D(F )@F > 0 (recall that 3   1   c < 0), and then for all p 2 [p0; p1);
D(p)  D(p2): But, D(p2) = (p2   c) [ + (1   )(1   P )N 1] = E : Consequently, this is
not a protable deviation.
If c+ 1  3 < p0 for some N; then for any p 2 [c+ 1  3; p0]; it holds that F (p+ 1  3) = 0.
It follows that @D(p)@p > 0 and D(p)  D(p0)  E as the previous argument applies. (Notice
however that as N !1; p0 ! 0; and c+ 1   3 > 0.)
iii. The deviator o¤ers a high-quality at p 2 (p4; 4]: Low-end consumers do not buy here (they
strictly prefer a low quality, or a high quality at a lower price), and high-end consumers buy
only if deviators deal is the best available. For deviations with p 2 [p4; p1 + 4   2], deviators
prot is
D(p) = (p  c)(P   F (p+ 2   4))N 1:
For p 2 (p4; p1 + 4   2]; p+ 2   4 2 (p0; p1] and F (p+ 2   4) is dened by
(p+ 2   4)[(1  )(1  F (p+ 2   4))N 1 + (P   F (p+ 2   4))N 1] = E : (20)
By (24), deviators price and its prot can be written respectively as:
p = 4   2 + c+ E
(1  )(1  F )N 1 + (P   F )N 1 and
D(F ) = f4   2   c+ E
(1  )(1  F )N 1 + (P   F )N 1 g(P   F )
N 1:
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It can be shown that @D(F )@F < 0 (recall that 4   2   c > 0); and then in the relevant range
D(p)  D(p4): Notice that D(p4) = (p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1 = E : Hence, there is no gain
from such deviation. For deviations with p 2 (p1 + 4   2; 4]; neither low-end nor high-end
consumers purchase, so clearly there is no gain from such deviation.
Finally, notice that, as the deviations above are not protable, rms cannot gain from mixing
on quality either.
Proof of Corollary 2. a) Let  = 1=2: Then, (9) becomes
b(
2  P
1 + P
) =

P
1  P

, P = 1 + 3b 
p
1 + b(14 + b)
 2(1  b) for b 6= 1 and P = 1=2 for b = 1:
It can be easily checked that P 2 (0; 1) for b 2 (0;1) with limb!1 P = 1: For N  2; a QS is
welfare decreasing if
(4   2   c)P 2 < (3   1   c) [(1  P )2   1], P < 2b
2b+ 1
;
and is consumer surplus decreasing if
(4   2   c)P [P + 2(1 + P )] < (c  3 + 1) [1  (1  P )2], P < 2(b  1)
3 + b
:
The result then follows.
b) Let b = 1: Then, (9) becomes
1  

2
[
+ (1  )(1  P )
(1  ) + P ] =

P
1  P

,
P =
(1  )[2(1  )2 +   p(1  2)2 + 4]
2(1  2)(1  + 2) if  6= 1=2 and P = 1=2 if  = 1=2:
It can be easily checked that P 2 (0; 1) for  2 (0; 1) with lim!0 P = 1 and lim!1 P = 0:
A QS is welfare decreasing whenever
P 2 < (1  )[1  (1  P )2], P < 2(1  );
which turns out to be true for all s.
A QS is consumer surplus decreasing if
P [P + 2(1 +

1  P )] < (1  )[1  (1  P )
2], P < 2(1  2)(1  )
1  + 2 :
This leads to the result.
c) Let b =


1  
2
. Then, (9) becomes:
[
+ (1  )(1  P )
(1  ) + P ] =

P
1  P

,
P =
2(1  ) +p5  4(1  )]
2(1  2) for  6= 1=2 and P = 1=2 for  = 1=2:
It can be easily checked that P 2 (0; 1) for  2 (0; 1) with lim!1 P = 0: First notice that if
a QS raises welfare, then it also raises consumer surplus (see Proposition 2). A QS is welfare
increasing whenever
(4   2   c)P 2 > (c  3 + 1) (1  )[1  (1  P )2], P > 2b(1  )
+ b(1  ) :
The result then follows.
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5.2 Appendix B: Uncovered Market Equilibrium
In this part, I present the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in the uncovered market case.
A su¢ cient condition for the market to be uncovered is 4  2 > 3: In this case the support of
the price cdf is [p0; p1][ [p2; 3][ [p3; p4]: Notice rst that expressions (3)-(9) still apply. To pin
down the equilibrium cdfs it is necessary to identify the boundary price p3 and the probability
to price below 3; that is F (3) < 1. These are implicitly dened by (5) together with:
(3) = (3   c)[(P + 1  F (3))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (3))N 1] and (21)
(p3) = (p3   c)(P + 1  F (3))N 1:
low-end consumers purchase a high-quality at 3 (which leaves them with zero net surplus) only if
this is the lowest price in the market and they no longer purchase it at p3 because their valuation
of a high-quality is lower. high-end consumers obtain a higher net surplus from the high-quality
sold at 3 than from the best possible low-quality deal, that is 4 3 > 2 p0 , 4 2+p0 > 3:
Similarly, high-end consumers obtain a higher net surplus from the high-quality sold at p3 than
from the best possible low-quality deal, that is 4   p3 > 2   p0 , 4   2 + p0 = p4 > p3:
Hence, they buy at 3 or at p3 if all other rms o¤er a low-quality or charge a higher price.
Proposition 3 For N  2 and 4 2 > 3; there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
where rms randomize on prices and qualities. Firms choose prices with support S = [p0; p1] [
[p2; 3][ [p3; p4]: The boundary prices p0; p1; p2; p3 and p4 are dened by (3), (6), (8) and (21).
The atomless pricing cdf F (p) is dened implicitly by
p[(1  )(1  F (p))N 1 + (P   F (p))N 1] = p1(1  )(1  P )N 1 for p0  p  p1;
(p  c)[(P + 1  F (p))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (p))N 1] =
(p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1 for p2  p  3; and
(p  c)(P + 1  F (p))N 1 = (p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1 for p3  p  p4: (22)
where P = F (p1) = F (p2) is the probability of choosing a low-quality dened by (9) and p3 is
dened by (5) and (21). A low-quality is associated with prices in [p0; p1] and a high-quality with
prices in [p2; p4]:
Proof. As most of the arguments overlap with those presented in the proof of proposition 1, I
focus here on the additional arguments required for the uncovered market case.
a) Pricing cdf analysis. Let us consider prices in [p3; p4] which are assigned positive density
if p4 > 3. By (22), F is increasing in p: I show in continuation that F (p3) = F (3): Notice rst
that from (21), the boundary price p3 is given by
p3 = c+
(3   c)[(P + 1  F (3))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (3))N 1]
(P + 1  F (3))N 1 : (23)
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If we evaluate (22) at p3 and substitute (23), then it becomes
(3   c)[(P + 1  F (3))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (3))N 1]
(P + 1  F (3))N 1 (P + 1  F (p3))
N 1 =
(p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1:
But, as indi¤erence between 3 and p4 requires
(3   c)[(P + 1  F (3))N 1 + (1  )(1  F (3))N 1] = (p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1
it follows that F (p3) = F (3):
b) Boundary prices. When p4 > 3; from (7) and (3) in (21), it follows that
p1 = 1   3 + c+ (3   c)(P + 1  F (3))
N 1 + (1  )(1  F (3))N 1
+ (1  )(1  P )N 1  1:
Also, using (5) and (21), it can also be shown that p3 2 (3; p4):
c) Deviations. Two additional deviations need to be considered in this case. Note that they
replace iii) in the Proof of Proposition 1. First, suppose that the deviator o¤ers a high-quality
at p 2 (3; p3). low-end consumers do not buy here, so deviators prot is
D(p) = (p  c)(P + 1  F (3))N 1 < (p3   c)(P + 1  F (3))N 1 = E :
Such deviation is not protable. Finally, suppose that the deviator o¤ers a high-quality at
p 2 (p4; 4). low-end consumers do not buy here, so deviators prot is
D(p) = (p  c)(P   F (p+ 2   4))N 1:
When p 2 (p4; 4); then p+ 2   4 2 (p0; 2) so that F (p+ 2   4) is dened by
(p+ 2   4)[(1  )(1  F (p+ 2   4))N 1 + (P   F (p+ 2   4))N 1] = E : (24)
By (24), deviators price and its prot can be written respectively as:
p = 4   2 + c+ E
(1  )(1  F )N 1 + (P   F )N 1 and
D(F ) = f4   2   c+ E
(1  )(1  F )N 1 + (P   F )N 1 g(P   F )
N 1:
It can be shown that @D(F )@F < 0 (recall that 4   2   c > 0); and then in the relevant range
D(p)  D(p4): Notice that D(p4) = (p0 + 4   2   c)PN 1 = E : Hence, there is no gain
from such deviation, either.
The following example illustrates the type of mixed strategy equilibrium presented in Propo-
sition 3.
Example 2 Let N = 2;  = :5; 1 = 6; 2 = 7; c = 10; 3 = 14 and 4 = 23: Using the results
in Proposition 2, at equilibrium, p0 = 1:82; p1 = 3:39; p2 = 11:39; p3 = 15:29; p4 = 17:82;
P = :30 and F (3) = :86: The price cdf is
F (p) =
8>><>>:
:65  1:183p for p 2 [1:82; 3:39]
1:15  1:183p 10 for p 2 [11:39; 14]
1:3  2:366p 10) for p 2 [15:29; 17:82]
:
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The equilibrium prot is 1:183: Consumer surplus is 6:33 and total welfare is 8:69. Figure 3
illustrates the mixed strategy equilibrium in this case.
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Figure 3: The price cdf in Example 2
As before, expected prot of a rm is given by E = (4   2   c)(1 + 1 PN 1)PN 1: If
p4 > 3; a minimum quality standard is welfare decreasing whenever
(4   2   c)PN + (3   c) (1  )(1  F (3))N < (3   1   c) (1  )[(1  P )N   1]:
In the equilibrium presented in Proposition 3, high-end consumers buy a high-quality if at
least one rm supplies it (which happens with probability 1 PN ), and low-end consumers buy
a low-quality if at least one rm supplies it (which happens with probability 1   (1   P )N ).
Then, only if all rms o¤er a low-quality, high-end consumers buy a low-quality. And, low-end
consumers buy a high-quality only if all rms o¤er a price in the interval [p2; 3]. Then, welfare
is given by:
(4  c)(1 PN )+ 2PN + 1(1 )[1  (1 P )N ]+ (3  c)(1 )[(1 P )N   (1 F (3))N ]:
Consumer surplus equals total welfare minus aggregate prots.
Welfare and consumer surplus under a relevant QS are given by (14). When p4 > 3; a QS
might decrease both consumer surplus and welfare (see Example 3); raise both consumer surplus
and welfare (see Example 4); or decrease welfare and raise consumer surplus (see Example 2 and
notice that welfare and consumer surplus under a QS is 8:5).
Example 3 Let N = 2;  = :1; 1 = 7; 2 = 8; c = 10; 3 = 14 and 4 = 23: Under a QS,
welfare and consumer surplus equal WMQS = CSMQS = 4:9, while at the symmetric equilibrium
the free market creates total welfare W = 7:16 and consumer surplus CS = 6:17: Then, a QS
reduces total welfare by 2:26 and consumer surplus by 1:27. (In this case, p4 = 15:5 > 3 = 14:)
Example 4 Let  = :5; 1 = 6; 2 = 7; c = 10; 3 = 14 and 4 = 30: Under a QS, welfare
and consumer surplus equal WMQS = CSMQS = 12, while at the symmetric equilibrium the free
market creates total welfare W = 11:96 and consumer surplus of CS = 9:02: Then, a QS raises
total welfare by :04 and consumer surplus by 2:98.
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